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MANY  KEY  ISSUES  STILL  LEFT  UNADDRESSED  IN
THE  SECURITIES  AND  EXCHANGE
COMMISSION’S  ATTEMPT  TO  MODERNIZE
ITS  RULES  OF  PRACTICE
Joseph Quincy Patterson*
“By bringing more cases in its own backyard, the agency is not only increas-
ing its chances of winning but giving itself greater control over the future
evolution of legal doctrine.”
—Joseph Grundfest, former SEC Commissioner1
INTRODUCTION
Towards the end of 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) lost three high-profile insider-trading cases in federal district court.2
Shortly after, the SEC instituted a new policy in which it “signaled its inten-
tion to bring as administrative actions certain kinds of enforcement actions
that historically it has more often brought in the federal courts.”3  This policy
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School 2017; Candidate for Masters in
Business Administration, University of Notre Dame, Mendoza College of Business, 2016;
Bachelor of Arts in Economics, Elon University.  I thank Professor A.J. Bellia for advising
this Note.
1 Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges: Agency Prevails Against Around 90% of
Defendants When It Sends Cases to Its Administrative Law Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803.
2 See SEC v. Jensen, No. CV11-5316-R, 2013 WL 6499699, at *31 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10,
2013) (holding that “[t]he SEC has not carried its burden of proof with respect to any of
the causes of action in the Complaint”); Verdict Form, SEC v. Kovzan, No. 11-2017-JWL (D.
Kan. Dec. 2, 2013) (Doc. 408); SEC v. Cuban, No. 3:08-CV-2050-D (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16,
2013); see also Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, U.S. Dist. Judge, S. Dist. of N.Y., PLI Securities Regula-
tion Institute Keynote Address: Is the S.E.C. Becoming a Law unto Itself? 9–10 (Nov. 5,
2014), https://securitiesdiary.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/rakoff-pli-speech.pdf (“[T]his
past year, the S.E.C. suffered stinging defeats in two such cases . . . . In both these cases,
novel and difficult legal issues were presented that led initially to both cases being dis-
missed[,] . . . but the issues were ultimately resolved by appellate decisions favorable to the
S.E.C.’s theories.  Nonetheless[,] when . . . the cases were ultimately tried to juries, the
S.E.C. lost.”).
3 Rakoff, supra note 2, at 2; see also Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges
It Appoints, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-
trials-to-judges-it-appoints-1413849590 (quoting Kara Brockmeyer, the head of the SEC’s
1675
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included bringing complicated insider-trading cases before Administrative
Law Judges (ALJs)4 rather than before a district court.5  The SEC claims that
the change was due to “recent statutory changes,”6 resulting from the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.7  By adding section
929P(a) to the previously enacted statutes, Congress authorized the SEC to
seek civil monetary penalties against “any persons or entities” regardless of
whether they are regulated by the SEC.8  The timing has caused some legal
experts to question whether the reason had more to do with giving the SEC a
home-court advantage.9  For instance, on May 7, 2015, the Wall Street Jour-
nal published an article, in which it criticized the SEC for its ninety-percent
success rate before an ALJ as compared to a sixty-nine-percent success rate
before a federal district court.10  By bringing cases in administrative proceed-
anti-foreign-corruption enforcement unit, as saying, “It’s fair to say it’s the new normal. . . .
Just like the rest of the enforcement division, we’re moving towards using administrative
proceedings more frequently.”); Gretchen Morgenson, At the S.E.C., a Question of Home-
Court Edge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/at-
the-sec-a-question-of-home-court-edge.html?_r=0 (quoting Andrew Ceresney, Director of
the Division of Enforcement, SEC, as saying, “Our expectation is that we will be bringing
more administrative proceedings given the recent statutory changes.”).
4 ALJs receive their authority “[u]nder the Administrative Procedure Act and the
Commission’s Rules of Practice.” Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/alj (last visited Mar. 18, 2016).  When the SEC’s Division
of Enforcement brings an “Order Instituting Proceeding” before an ALJ, the duties of the
ALJ consist of “taking evidence, determining whether the allegations are true, and issuing
an initial decision within a specified time period.” Id.
5 Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. SEC to File Some Insider-Trading Cases in Its In-House Court,
REUTERS (June 11, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/11/sec-insidertrad-
ing-idUSL2N0OS1AT20140611 (quoting Andrew Ceresney, Director of the Division of
Enforcement, SEC, as saying, “I do think we will bring insider-trading cases as administra-
tive proceedings in appropriate cases . . . .”); cf. id. (quoting Stephen Crimmins, partner at
K&L Gates and former SEC trial attorney as saying, “Prosecuting insider trading cases in
administrative proceedings would be a significant change.”).
6 Morgenson, supra note 3.
7 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see also infra notes 79–93 and accompanying text.
8 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(a), 124 Stat.
at 1862; see also Rakoff, supra note 2, at 5 (“Section 929P(a) [of the Dodd-Frank Act] gives
the S.E.C. the power through internal administrative proceedings to impose substantial
monetary penalties against any person or entity whatsoever if that person or entity has vio-
lated the federal securities laws, even if the violation was unintentional.” (emphasis added)
(citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(a))).  Histor-
ically, the SEC could not seek civil monetary penalties against non-regulated persons or
entities unless they brought the proceeding in a federal district court. Id. at 4–5.
9 See William McLucas & Matthew Martens, Opinion, How to Rein in the SEC, WALL ST.
J. (June 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-rein-in-the-sec-1433285747 (“One
need not be a conspiracy theorist to wonder whether at least part of the SEC’s rationale
was to avoid the federal courts.”).
10 See Eaglesham, supra note 1 (“The SEC won against 90% of defendants before its
own judges in contested cases from October 2010 through March of this year. . . . That was
markedly higher than 69% success the agency obtained against defendants in federal court
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ings rather than federal district courts, the defendant loses many procedural
rights that are guaranteed in federal district court, such as a right to a jury,
full discovery rights under federal law, and the Federal Rules of Evidence.11
This change in policy has many of the defendants who won a decision against
the SEC before a jury to “doubt [they] would have been able to develop the
facts that convinced the jury to find in [their] favor.”12  Additionally, this
change in policy by the SEC has led to an increase in the number of appeals
questioning whether the procedures used by the SEC violate the defendants’
right to due process13 and whether the SEC properly appointed the ALJs
according to Article II, section 2 of the United States Constitution, which
states that “Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments.”14
over the same period . . . .”); see also Rakoff, supra note 2, at 7 (“It is hardly surprising in
these circumstances that the S.E.C. won 100% of its internal administrative hearings in the
fiscal year ending September 30, 2014, whereas it won only 61% of its trials in federal court
during the same period.”).
11 See Ryan Jones, Note, The Fight over Home Court: An Analysis of the SEC’s Increased Use of
Administrative Proceedings, 68 SMU L. REV. 507, 523–28 (2015) (discussing the due process
and equal protection issues related to the increased number of cases being brought in
administrative proceedings as compared to federal district courts); see also Rakoff, supra
note 2, at 7 (“S.E.C. administrative proceedings involve much more limited discovery than
federal actions, with no provision whatsoever for either depositions or interrogatories. . . .
[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply . . . . Further still, there is no jury, and the
matter is decided by an [ALJ] appointed and paid by the S.E.C.”).
12 Jean Eaglesham, SEC Gives Ground on Judges: Facing Criticism and Challenges, Agency
Increases Defendants’ Legal Safeguards, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/sec-gives-ground-on-judges-1443139425 (quoting Joel Cohen, a partner at Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher LLP, who successfully defended Nelson Obus in 2014 against the SEC);
see also Brief of Mark Cuban as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Plaintiff-Appellee and
Affirmance at 2, Hill v. SEC, No. 15-12831 (11th Cir. Oct. 29, 2015), 2015 WL 6653553, at
*2 [hereinafter Cuban Amicus Brief] (“Had Mr. Cuban been subjected to the treatment
the SEC intends for Mr. Hill, without the procedural safeguards available in federal district
court before a presiding person with the stature and power to ensure fairness, Mr. Cuban
likely would have been found liable by an in-house SEC ALJ on an untested legal theory
and based on incomplete and misleading facts.”); Mark Cuban & Thomas Melsheimer,
Opinion, It Is Time to Rein in the SEC, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/it-is-time-to-rein-in-the-sec/2014/12/19/bb7b988c-86cd-11e4-b9b7-
b8632ae73d25_story.html (“In an SEC home-court proceeding, we wouldn’t have had the
right to take the deposition and to discover inconsistent testimony.  And would a judge on
the SEC payroll have been as persuaded as the jury was that the testimony was tainted by
undue SEC influence?  That hardly seems likely.”).
13 See generally Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction
at 12–33, Bebo v. SEC, No. 15-CV-00003 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Bebo Memo-
randum]; Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and in Opposition to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Motion to
Dismiss at 3–21, Chau v. SEC, No. 14-CV-01903-LAK (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2014).
14 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see Bebo Memorandum, supra note 13, at 34–42; Plaintiff’s
Supplemental Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or,
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These constitutional questions and the seeming home-court advantage
awarded to the SEC when it brings cases before ALJs rather than before fed-
eral district courts have led to much criticism.15  For example, over the past
few months, Jean Eaglesham has written multiple articles in the Wall Street
Journal about the SEC’s use of “in-house judges” and its high success rate.16
This negative publicity has some lawyers concerned that the general public
will begin to question the fairness of all administrative proceedings.17  Addi-
tionally, the SEC’s change in policy has many former SEC Commissioners,
enforcement chiefs, and ALJs criticizing the expanded use of administrative
proceedings.18  Some federal judges, including Supreme Court Justice
in the Alternative, a Preliminary Injunction at 4–14, Hill v. SEC, No. 15-CV-01801-LMM
(N.D. Ga. June 8, 2015) [hereinafter Hill Supplemental Brief].
15 See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 1-2, 7; see also Cuban Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 13
(“These procedures are woefully inadequate in complex securities fraud cases, such as
insider trading cases, and even the SEC’s General Counsel has recently acknowledged that
it is reasonable to question whether the rules governing administrative proceedings are still
appropriate and whether they should be updated.”).
16 Jean Eaglesham, Federal Judge Deals Another Blow to SEC Administrative Court, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-judge-deals-another-blow-to-sec-
administrative-court-1438792993; Jean Eaglesham, Federal Judge Rules SEC In-House Judge’s
Appointment ‘Likely Unconstitutional’, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/federal-judge-rules-sec-in-house-judges-appointment-likely-unconstitutional-14337961
61; Jean Eaglesham, SEC Ex-Enforcement Chief Calls for Reforms to In-House Judges, WALL ST. J.
(May 12, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-ex-enforcement-chief-calls-for-reforms-
to-in-house-judges-1431471223 [hereinafter Eaglesham, Overhaul]; Jean Eaglesham, SEC
Fights Challenges to Its In-House Courts, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/sec-fights-challenges-to-its-in-house-courts-1434927977 [hereinafter Eaglesham,
SEC Fights]; Eaglesham, supra note 12; Jean Eaglesham, SEC Trims Use of In-House Judges,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-trims-use-of-in-house-judges-
1444611604 [hereinafter Eaglesham, SEC Trims]; Eaglesham, supra note 1.
17 McLucas & Martens, supra note 9 (“Democratic self-governance requires that the
governed be generally convinced of the system’s evenhandedness.  We are concerned that
the SEC is damaging the perceived legitimacy of how the agency uses its enforcement
power.”); see also Peter J. Henning, New Criticism over the S.E.C.’s Use of In-House Judges, N.Y.
TIMES (July 20, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/business/dealbook/new-criticism-
over-the-secs-use-of-in-house-judges.html?_r=0 (“The notion that the S.E.C. has gathered
all the relevant information, and that a defendant cannot question witnesses in advance of
a trial, goes against the view that the [sic] each side should have the same opportunity to
put on its case.”).
18 See Eaglesham, supra note 1 (“Ms. McEwen [a former SEC judge] said the SEC in-
house judges were expected to work on the assumption that ‘the burden was on the people
who were accused to show that they didn’t do what the agency said they did.’”); McLucas &
Martens, supra note 9 (“Whatever the complaints about the administrative process, there is
no evidence that the ALJs harbor bias.  The commission, by contrast, is the same body that
brought the charges against the respondent.”); Daniel R. Walfish, The Real Problem with SEC
Administrative Proceedings, and How to Fix It, FORBES (July 20, 2015), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/07/20/the-real-problem-with-sec-administrative-proceed-
ings-and-how-to-fix-it/ (“My own observations are that the ALJs strive to be fair to all par-
ties . . . .”); cf. Eaglesham, Overhaul, supra note 16 (“Robert Mahony, who retired as an SEC
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Antonin Scalia, have also echoed these concerns that ALJs are “in effect
creat[ing] (and uncreat[ing]) new crimes at will.”19
As criticism continues to mount against the expanded use of internal
administrative actions, the SEC has drastically decreased its use of administra-
tive proceedings.20  One reason for this could be the recent decision in Hill
v. SEC, where the Federal District Court in the Northern District of Georgia
ruled that Hill, the defendant, “ha[d] proved a substantial likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits of his claim that the SEC ha[d] violated the Appointments
Clause . . . [and] the Court f[ound] a preliminary injunction [was] appropri-
ate to enjoin the SEC administrative proceeding.”21  Another reason for the
decrease in the SEC’s use of administrative proceedings could be the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce’s recent recommendations on how to improve the
SEC’s Rules of Practice.22  Regardless of the reason, the SEC recently pro-
posed amendments to its rules of procedure,23 in an attempt “to modernize
[its] rules.”24  The proposed amendments, however, are still inadequate.25
Additionally, the fact that the SEC is bringing fewer cases in administrative
proceedings does not mean it will not increase the number of cases brought
in the future.  This is especially relevant if the Court of Appeals holds that
judge in 2012 after more than 14 years at the agency, told the New York conference the
SEC judges were ‘absolutely 100% fair [and] straight.’” (alteration in original)).
19 Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 353 (2014) (Scalia, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari); see also Rakoff, supra note 2, at 11 (“[U]nder Dodd-Frank, [federal
securities laws] could increasingly be construed and interpreted by the S.E.C.’s administra-
tive law judges if the S.E.C. chose to bring its more significant cases in that forum.”).
20 See Eaglesham, SEC Trims, supra note 16 (“A review of 160 cases affecting more than
500 defendants shows that in the three months through September, the SEC sent just
11%—four of 36—of its contested cases to its administrative law judges.  That was down
from 40% in the like period of 2014.”).
21 Hill v. SEC, No. 1:5-CV-01801-LMM, 2015 WL 4307088, at *20 (N.D. Ga. June 8,
2015).  Note that the SEC is currently appealing this decision to the Eleventh Circuit. See
Brief for the Appellant at 15–21, Hill v. SEC, No. 15-12831 (11th Cir. Sept. 8, 2015).
22 See generally CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMPETITIVENESS,
EXAMINING U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT (2015) [hereinafter
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS]; infra notes 84–110 and accompanying text.
23 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE COMMISSION’S RULES OF PRACTICE
(2015) [hereinafter SEC, AMENDMENTS]; cf. Peter J. Henning, A Small Step in Changing
S.E.C. Administrative Proceedings, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/09/29/business/dealbook/a-small-step-in-changing-sec-administrative-proceed-
ings.html (“[T]he S.E.C. did not acknowledge that the proposed changes were in any way
related to criticism that its use of administrative proceedings gave the impression it was
seeking a ‘home court advantage’ through truncated procedures to help get the outcome
it wanted.”).
24 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes to Amend Rules Governing
Administrative Proceedings (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-
209.html [hereinafter SEC, Press Release on Amendments].
25 See infra Section IV.C.
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Hill does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to bring a case in federal court,
similar to Bebo v. SEC.26
This Note analyzes and explains the current issues and criticism regard-
ing the SEC’s use of ALJs.  In particular, this Note recommends that the SEC
ratify its ALJs in accordance with constitutional requirements, create a rigid
formula for its forum selection, and amend its Rules of Practice to align more
closely to the procedural due process rights in federal district courts.  As
many of these topics are currently being discussed in federal courts of
appeals and within the SEC—through its proposed amendments to the Rules
of Practice—this Note intends to add to the discussion on a topic with very
little scholarly research.  In the SEC’s defense, the SEC’s mission to “protect
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation”27 is a necessary and important mission.  Regardless of the mis-
sion, individuals are still guaranteed constitutional rights to procedural due
process of law when there is a possibility of being “deprived of life, liberty or
property.”28  The first Part of this Note will discuss the historical expansion of
the SEC’s enforcement powers.  Part II will discuss the current enforcement
procedures and the SEC’s recently proposed amendments to its Rules of
Practice.  Part III will discuss the recent constitutional challenges that
defendants have brought against the SEC and the issues regarding subject-
matter jurisdiction in federal district courts.  Part IV will propose three rec-
ommendations that the SEC should follow to avoid future criticism of its
administrative proceedings.
I. HISTORY OF THE SEC’S ENFORCEMENT POWER AND PROCEDURES
Following the collapse of the United States economy during the Great
Depression, Congress enacted the Federal Securities Act of 193329 in order
to protect investors and “prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud
in the sale of securities.”30  In the following year, Congress passed the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.31  Since the inception of the SEC, it has struggled
to “balance competing interests,”32 arising from the three objectives man-
26 Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 775 (7th Cir. 2015) (“We see no evidence . . . that
Congress intended for plaintiffs like Bebo who are already subject to ongoing administra-
tive enforcement proceedings to be able to stop those proceedings by challenging the
constitutionality of the enabling legislation or the structural authority of the SEC.”).
27 What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (last visited Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.sec
.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
28 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
29 See generally Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 112-106, 48 Stat. 74.
30 Fast Answers: The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
31 See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 112–158, 48 Stat. 881.
32 Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of the His-
tory and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 368
(2008); see, e.g., id. (“As the SEC and its regulatory powers have grown in response to the
ever more complex and international financial services markets, the seemingly straightfor-
ward mission of investor protection has become more intricate and multidimensional,
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dated to the SEC: “to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient
markets; and facilitate capital formation.”33  Therefore, it is important to give
a quick summary of the history of the SEC.
A. The Modest Expansion of Enforcement Power During
the First Fifty Years of Existence
Although the SEC was created through the Securities Exchange Act,34
the Enforcement Division of the SEC was not created until 1972.35  Up until
this point, “the Regional Offices conducted ‘[n]early all of the investiga-
tions,’ . . . while the Commission’s Trading and Exchanges Division played a
largely supervisory and coordinating role.”36  Additionally, “its enforcement
powers were largely limited to seeking injunctions in federal district courts to
enjoin violations of the securities laws, and the only express provision for
administrative hearings was to suspend or expel members or officers of
national securities exchanges.”37
During the 1960s, with the adoption of new rules, the SEC’s “enforce-
ment program grew to become ‘the life and breath of the Commission[,] . . .
the guts of the agency.’”38  To bring about this change, William J. Casey,
then-Chairman of the SEC, restructured the organization to include “one
division devoted entirely to enforcement.”39  Additionally, in 1972, Chairman
Casey formed “an advisory committee to ‘review and evaluate the Commis-
sion’s enforcement policies and practices and to make such recommenda-
tions as they deemed appropriate.’”40  Later, this committee was termed the
Wells Commission and provided many recommendations to protect defend-
ants against an SEC enforcement proceeding.41  In particular, the Wells
prompting questions such as, ‘Who are the investors that should be protected?’ and ‘How
should they be protected?’”).
33 See What We Do, supra note 27.
34 See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4.
35 See DANIEL M. HAWKE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SEC’S ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM
1934–1981, at 2–3 (2002), http://www.lexissecuritiesmosaic.com/gateway/sec/speech/
2000_2002_0101_SECHS_RT_Enfrmnt_Hawke.PDF.
36 Id. at 2 (quoting U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 182 (1940)).
37 Rakoff, supra note 2, at 3.
38 HAWKE, supra note 35, at 3 (quoting U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, “. . . GOOD PEOPLE,
IMPORTANT PROBLEMS AND WORKABLE LAWS”: 50 YEARS OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 46 (1984)).
39 Id.
40 Atkins & Bondi, supra note 32, at 375 (quoting JOHN A. WELLS ET AL., SEC REPORT
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES (June 1, 1972), in
ARTHUR F. MATHEWS ET AL., ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAWS 1973, at 275, 285 (1973)).
41 Id. at 376–77; see, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE
COMMENCEMENT OF ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS AND TERMINATION OF STAFF INVESTIGATIONS
1 (1972) (“The Report of the Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices
[the Wells Report] . . . contained several recommendations designed to afford persons
under investigation by the Commission an opportunity to present their positions to the
Commission prior to the authorization of an enforcement proceeding.” (citing U.S. SEC. &
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Commission wanted to ensure that the defendants maintained their right to
due process, “a hallmark of our Anglo-American judicial system.”42  It is
important to note that with all of the expansions of powers from 1934 until
1972, “the expansion was tied to the agency’s oversight of regulated entities
or those representing those entities before the Commission” and any
“broader remedies and sanctions it could [only obtain] by going to federal
court.”43
B. The Post-Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 Expansions of Powers
The second Chairman of the SEC defended the powers of the adminis-
trative proceedings by stating the reason for these powers “is that no practical
alternative exists in our complex society.”44  When the SEC had limited pow-
ers, this was true; however, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 pro-
vided the SEC, at its own request, “the power to order prospective
compliance through injunctions.”45  Although at the time this ancillary
power only applied to “regulated persons and entities and only for certain
violations of the securities laws,”46 the SEC in effect received similar powers
through administrative proceedings as it would have had in federal courts.47
Further, during the 1980s, the SEC switched from primarily having a
remedial and deterrent purpose—through injunctive and disgorgement rem-
edies—to being “punitive in nature.”48  Historically, the “power to seek ‘pen-
alties’ in the form of prison sentences, criminal fines and restitution resided
solely in the Department of Justice (‘DOJ’) and state authorities.”49  Then, in
1984, the Insider Trading Act, provided treble damages for the SEC to use in
insider-trading cases.50  Additionally, when combining the additional
enforcement remedies provided by the Insider Trading Act,51 the Insider
EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRAC-
TICES 31 (JUNE 1, 1972))).
42 Atkins & Bondi, supra note 32, at 383.
43 Rakoff, supra note 2, at 3.
44 Id. at 12.
45 Id. at 4.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Atkins & Bondi, supra note 32, at 383–84.  For example, in a 1984 congressional
report, the SEC sent a report to Congress stating that “[t]he federal securities laws are
presently viewed by the courts as remedial rather than punitive.” Id. (quoting Memoran-
dum from John S.R. Shad, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n to Rep. Timothy E.
Wirth, Chairman, Subcomm. on Telecomms., Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the H. Energy &
Commerce Comm. 350 (Feb. 22, 1984)).  However, by 1989, the SEC stated that “variable-
penalty provisions are appropriate to penalize and deter the broad range of conduct for
which these penalties will be assessed.” Id. at 384 (quoting Hearing on H.R. 975 Before the
Subcomm. On Telecomms. & Fin. Of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 101st Cong. 36
(1989) (statement of David S. Ruder, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n)).
49 Atkins & Bondi, supra note 32, at 386.
50 Id. at 387.
51 Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–376, 98 Stat. 1264.
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Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,52 and the Securities
Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990.53  Through
these three statutes, the SEC gained the power to “seek civil monetary penal-
ties,” “to bar directors and officers . . . from serving in those capacities,” and
“to issue administrative cease-and-desist orders, temporary restraining orders,
and orders for disgorgement.”54
Although the SEC could now bring cases involving defendants not regu-
lated by the SEC as administrative proceedings, the sanctions available were
very limited and did not include civil monetary penalties.55  The ability to
impose monetary penalties and more severe penalties in administrative pro-
ceedings still only applied to persons or entities regulated by the SEC.56  In
addition, the ability to bring monetary civil penalties in administrative pro-
ceedings, was still rare until after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.57
C. The Expansion of Civil Monetary Penalties Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Following the Enron and WorldCom scandals in the early part of the
21st century, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).58  SOX
further expanded the SEC’s enforcement powers by granting the SEC “the
power to employ administrative proceedings to bar any person who had vio-
lated the securities laws from serving as an officer or director of a public
company.”59  It also increased the ability of the SEC to impose monetary civil
penalties for violations of the securities laws in administrative proceedings—
against regulated persons or entities—and imposed “significant, additional
requirements on corporations and their officers and directors.”60
Just as important as the changes SOX brought about was the change in
policy at the SEC.61  Following the Penny Stock Reform Act, Congress
expected the SEC to use its punitive powers “only when a violation resulted in
improper benefits to shareholders”62 and federal courts to keep this power in
52 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100–704, 102 Stat. 4677.
53 Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101–429, 104 Stat. 931.
54 Atkins & Bondi, supra note 32, at 385.
55 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 11–12.
56 Id.; see also Rakoff, supra note 2, at 3, 5.
57 See Sonia A. Steinway, Comment, SEC “Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly,” but What
Do They Say? A Critical Analysis of the SEC’s New Enforcement Approach, 124 YALE L.J. 209, 211
fig.1 (2014); see also Atkins & Bondi, supra note 32, at 394 (“After the Remedies Act was
signed into law in 1990 and before the SEC’s April 2002 Xerox case, the Commission
brought only four issuer-penalty cases, totaling less than $5 million.”).
58 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
59 Rakoff, supra note 2, at 5.
60 Atkins & Bondi, supra note 32, at 395.
61 Id. at 394 (“The Xerox case, in which the company paid a $10 million penalty, is
viewed by many as the beginning of the ‘corporate penalty era’ at the Commission.”).
62 Id. at 393.
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check.63  Following SOX, the SEC sought civil monetary damages in many
more cases than before.64  Additionally, the civil monetary damages sought
were much larger65 and possibly targeted primarily at larger corporations.66
In conclusion, SOX greatly expanded the SEC’s enforcement powers and set
the stage for the Dodd-Frank Act, which would expand the SEC’s enforce-
ment powers even further, especially in regards to the types of cases brought
in administrative proceedings.
II. CURRENT SEC ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES AND
RECENT PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
This Part will look at the changes to the SEC’s enforcement practices
following the Dodd-Frank Act.  The changes in enforcement practices and
expansion of power have many legal experts recommending procedural
changes to bring the SEC into compliance with constitutional due process
requirements.67  In particular, the United States Chamber of Commerce
recently released a report examining the SEC’s enforcement division and
presenting twenty-eight separate recommendations—addressing issues with
the SEC’s current Rules of Practice.68  Shortly after the Chamber of Com-
merce’s report, the SEC proposed amendments to its enforcement prac-
tices,69 following some but not all of the Chamber of Commerce’s
recommendations.70  Therefore, following the discussion on the changes in
enforcement practices and expansion of enforcement powers, this Part will
discuss the recommendations presented by the Chamber of Commerce and
the SEC’s recently proposed amendments to “modernize” its enforcement
practices.71
63 Id. (“Congress took comfort in the fact that federal judges would operate as an
independent check to the Commission’s decision to seek an issuer penalty and the amount
sought to be recovered.”).
64 Id. at 400 (“The total amount of issuer penalties in 2003 and 2004 was greater than
the total amount of all penalties imposed by the SEC for the prior fifteen years combined.
From 2003 through 2007, approximately $13.8 billion in disgorgement and civil penalties
were ordered to be paid to the SEC, courts, or other appointed trustees.”).
65 See Steinway, supra note 57, at 210 (“Since 2000, the growth has been even more
striking: penalties have grown 30% year-over-year, compared to 3% growth in cases filed.”).
66 James D. Cox et al., Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have Things
Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 902 (2005) (finding that the “[a]verage
market capitalization for SEC enforcement targets was more than twenty-three times bigger
in the post-January 1, 2002, time period than in the earlier period, while the median mar-
ket capitalization went up by a multiple of over thirteen times”).
67 See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
68 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22.
69 See generally SEC, AMENDMENTS, supra note 23.
70 See infra Section IV.C.
71 SEC, Press Release on Amendments, supra note 24.
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A. Expansion of Enforcement Powers Following the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act
Following the financial crisis of 2008, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank
Act, with the goal
[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end “too big to
fail,” to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect con-
sumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.72
The Dodd-Frank Act, however, also significantly expanded the SEC’s
administrative enforcement power to levels never seen before in the SEC.73
The problem with this expansion is that “the S.E.C. can today obtain through
internal administrative proceedings nearly everything it might obtain by
going to court.”74  Not only is this concerning because it is exactly what many
in Congress and internally within the SEC did not want to happen when
expanding the SEC’s power during the 1980s,75 but it also deprives defend-
ants of many procedural rights which are guaranteed under due process of
law if brought in federal district court.76
The main expansion of the SEC’s enforcement power comes from Sec-
tion 929P(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which allows the SEC to impose civil
monetary penalties in an administrative proceeding upon any person who
has violated the federal securities laws.77  This is new because in the past, the
SEC could only impose civil monetary penalties through administrative pro-
ceedings on persons or entities regulated by the SEC,78 not simply any per-
son.  The SEC and Congress defended its new expansion of enforcement
power by stating that Section 929P(a) “streamlines the SEC’s existing
enforcement authorities by permitting the SEC to seek civil money penalties
72 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see SEC, Press Release on Amendments, supra note 24.
73 See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 5.
74 Id.; see also CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 12.
75 See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 32, at 393–94 (“The concern among members of
Congress and internally at the SEC was that if the same remedies were available to the SEC
under both judicial and administrative proceedings, then the SEC might be perceived to
have an incentive to conduct more enforcement actions through its own administrative
proceedings, rather than before a federal district court judge.”).
76 See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 6–7 (discussing the differences between an SEC adminis-
trative proceeding and a federal district court proceeding and noting that “[i]t is hardly
surprising in these circumstances that the S.E.C. won 100% of its internal administrative
hearings in . . . 2014, whereas it won only 61% of its trials in federal court during the same
period”); see also infra notes 162–207 and accompanying text.
77 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111–203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1862; see also Rakoff, supra note 2, at 5 (“Section 929P(a)
gives the S.E.C. the power through internal administrative proceedings to impose substan-
tial monetary penalties against any person or entity whatsoever . . . .”).
78 See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 2, at 2 (quoting Andrew Ceresney, Director of the Divi-
sion of Enforcement of the SEC, as saying, “Our expectation is that we will be bringing
more administrative proceedings given the recent statutory changes.”).
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in cease-and-desist proceedings under Federal securities laws.”79  Section 211
continues by stating that the new streamlined enforcement power allows due
process because it is “coextensive with its authority to seek penalties in Fed-
eral court, and because, similar to a proceeding in federal district court, the
defendant can appeal the penalty to a federal appeals court.”80  In contrast
to the SEC’s reasoning, Chevron deference prevents the defendants from
receiving a proper appellate procedure.81  Additionally, the SEC can now
bring complicated insider-trading cases in an administrative proceeding,82
which deprives defendants of their constitutional right to procedural due
process.83
B. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Criticism of SEC Enforcement Practices and
the SEC’s Proposed Amendments to the SEC’s Rules of Practice
In July of 2015, the United States Chamber of Commerce released a
lengthy report that examined the SEC’s enforcement division and practices
and also issued twenty-eight separate recommendations on how to improve
the SEC’s current enforcement practices.84  The recommendations were bro-
ken down into three main categories: recommendations on SEC enforce-
ment policies, recommendations on commission oversight of the
enforcement program, and recommendations to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the SEC investigative process.85  All three categories are
important for the SEC to examine when implementing new policies.  For the
purposes of this Note, the focus will be more on the first category—recom-
mendations on SEC enforcement policies.  In particular, the first four recom-
mendations on “providing a structure for the choice of forum decision that
incorporates due process protection” are directly related to the due process
issues defendants are bringing in federal district and appellate courts.86
It is important to note that the Chamber of Commerce did not submit
these recommendations with the intent to hinder the enforcement efforts of
the SEC.87  Instead, these recommendations—in particular the first four rec-
ommendations—are intended to ensure a “tough-as-nails, vigorous, effective
79 COMM. ON FIN. SERVICES, H.R. REP. NO. 111–687, § 211, at 78 (2009), https://www
.congress.gov/111/crpt/hrpt687/CRPT-111hrpt687-pt1.pdf.
80 Id.
81 See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
82 See, e.g., CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 12 (“Section
925 of the Dodd-Frank Act . . . further expanded the Commission’s sanctioning power . . . .
It also provided the authority to impose money penalties against persons or entities not
registered with the Commission.”).
83 See infra Section III.C.
84 See generally CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22.
85 See id. at 1.
86 See id. at 3 (stating that the differences between administrative proceedings and
federal district court “can have a significant impact on the procedural rights of a defen-
dant/respondent and, ultimately, on the respondent’s ability to obtain a full, fair, and
impartial adjudication” (emphasis added)).
87 Id. at 2.
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enforcement coupled with a clear and fair process.”88  The first three recom-
mendations directly address the issue Judge Rakoff presented in his address
at the PLI Securities Regulation Institute’s 2014 conference.  Judge Rakoff
was concerned that through the use of its ALJs, the SEC was in effect creating
new law.89  The first recommendation directly addresses this issue by imple-
menting a clear process for the SEC to utilize when determining whether the
case should be brought as an administrative proceeding or before a federal
district court.90  The second recommendation helps to remove any remain-
ing ambiguity in the SEC’s selection of forum by allowing defendants to
“challenge the choice of forum” selected by the SEC.91  The third recom-
mendation is slightly more drastic than the first two.  It states, “The Commis-
sion should adopt a policy that any party named in an administrative
proceeding that desires a jury trial may file a notice to remove the proceed-
ing to federal district court.”92  The fourth recommendation also addresses
many due process issues, by recommending the SEC revise its current
enforcement practices concerning pre-trial discovery and length of the pre-
hearing process.93
On May 8, 2015, the SEC’s enforcement division released a guideline on
how to decide whether to bring a case in an administrative proceeding or in
federal district court.94  Although there is no indication that the SEC was
responding to recent criticism in its report, the timing suggests that the SEC
was in fact responding to recent criticism, which even came from within the
SEC itself.95  The approach to forum selection identifies four key factors that
should be considered.96  First, the enforcement division said that it will con-
88 Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
89 See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 12 (concluding his address by saying, “I would urge the
S.E.C. to consider that it is neither in its own long-term interest, nor in the interest of the
securities markets, nor in the interest of the public as a whole, for the S.E.C. to become, in
effect, a law onto itself.”).
90 See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 3 (stating that the
SEC should only use administrative proceedings if “[t]he proceeding is based upon well-
established legal principles that have been adopted by Article III courts” and other factors
listed in the recommendation); see also infra Section IV.B.
91 See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 4.
92 See id. (emphasis added).
93 Id.; see infra Section IV.C (discussing the differences between federal district court
procedures and administrative proceedings).
94 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT APPROACH TO FORUM SELEC-
TION IN CONTESTED ACTIONS (2015), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcement-
approach-forum-selection-contested-actions.pdf [hereinafter SEC, FORUM SELECTION].
95 See Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the “SEC
Speaks” Conference 2015: A Fair, Orderly and Efficient SEC (Feb. 20, 2015), http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/022015-spchcmsp.html (“To avoid the perception that the
Commission is taking its tougher cases to its in-house judges, and to ensure that all are
treated fairly and equally, the Commission should set out and implement guidelines for
determining which cases are brought in administrative proceedings and which in federal
courts.”).
96 See SEC FORUM SELECTION, supra note 94, at 1–3.
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sider “[t]he availability of the desired claims, legal theories, and forms of
relief in each forum.”97  Second, it will consider “[w]hether any charged
party is a registered entity or an individual associated with a registered
entity.”98  Third, it will consider “[t]he cost-, resource-, and time-effectiveness
of litigation in each forum.”99  Fourth, it will take into account “[f]air, consis-
tent, and effective resolution of securities law issues and matters.”100  It is also
made very clear in the guidelines that these four factors are not dispositive
and each case will be looked at on a case-by-case basis.101  Therefore,
although it appears that the SEC has already addressed the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce’s first recommendation, it has also been made explicitly clear that
the SEC retains its right to bring cease-and-desist proceedings before an ALJ,
at its own discretion.102
More recently, on September 24, 2015, the SEC released a list of amend-
ments that would update its Rules of Practice.103  The proposed amendments
are primarily related to the fourth recommendation proposed by the Cham-
ber of Commerce’s report, which called for revisions to the Rules of Practice
“to provide adequate opportunities for pre-trial discovery and deposi-
tions.”104  The key parts of the amendments seek “to adjust the timing of
hearings and other deadlines in administrative proceedings and to provide
parties in administrative proceedings with the ability to use depositions and
other discovery tools.”105  Although the SEC mentions multiple times in its
proposed amendments that the “proposed amendments . . . would outline
procedures for deposition practice that are consistent with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure,”106 there are still many places where the proposed
amendments fall short of the protections provided in federal district
97 Id. at 1.
98 Id. at 2.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 3.
101 Id. at 1 (“While the list of potentially relevant considerations set out below is not
(and could not be) exhaustive, the Division may in its discretion consider any or all of the
factors in assessing whether to recommend that a contested case be brought in the admin-
istrative forum or in federal district court.”).
102 Id. (“The Commission generally is authorized to bring its enforcement actions in
either of two forums—a civil action in federal district court or a Commission administrative
proceeding (and/or cease-and-desist proceeding) before an [ALJ] . . . .”); see also Nicolas
Bourtin et al., Sullivan & Cromwell Discusses SEC Guidance on Approach to Forum Selection in
Contested Actions, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 15, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/
2015/06/15/sullivan-cromwell-discusses-sec-guidance-on-approach-to-forum-selection-in-
contested-actions/ (“It is also noteworthy that the SEC continues to assert its right—and
even suggests a preference—to pursue novel securities law questions in administrative pro-
ceedings rather than in federal court actions.”).
103 See generally SEC, AMENDMENTS, supra note 23, at 1.
104 See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 4.
105 SEC, AMENDMENTS, supra note 23, at 1.
106 Id. at 8; see also id. at 13 (discussing how the proposed amendments would make the
SEC’s Rules of Practice similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when expert wit-
nesses submit information for an administrative proceeding); id. at 14 (proposing to
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courts107—for example, SEC rules on hearsay,108 depositions,109 and length
of time for defendants to conduct discovery.110
III. RECENT CHALLENGES BROUGHT AGAINST THE SEC AND WHY DISTRICT
COURTS ARE HESITANT TO HEAR THEM
On March 1, 2011, the SEC instituted an internal cease-and-desist pro-
ceeding against its first non-regulated person, Rajat K. Gupta, in an adminis-
trative proceeding.111  Gupta and twenty-eight other similarly situated
defendants from Galleon—some of whom were regulated by the SEC—were
charged with insider trading.112  Gupta, however, was the only defendant
whose case was brought within the SEC rather than in federal district
court.113  Gupta challenged this “seeming exercise in forum-shopping” on
the grounds that he was being denied his right to equal protection of the
law.114  He also argued that the Dodd-Frank Act was being applied retroac-
tively to his case, considering his alleged actions occurred before the Dodd-
Frank Act was passed.  It was undisputed that before the act was passed, “the
SEC had no power to impose such penalties in an administrative action
against a non-regulated person.”115  The SEC moved to dismiss the case on
extend the methods of service to be similar to the methods provided in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure).
107 See infra Section IV.C.
108 Compare SEC, AMENDMENTS, supra note 23, at 16–17 (stating that hearsay is in fact
admissible in administrative proceedings), with FED. R. EVID. 802 (“Hearsay is not
admissible . . . .”).
109 Compare SEC, AMENDMENTS, supra note 23, at 7 (allowing defendants to “file notices
to depose three persons”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 31(a)(1)–(2) (allowing up to 10 depositions
without leave, and even more with leave).  Additionally, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
stated in their recommendations that “changes should be made to the Commission’s rules
governing administrative proceedings to . . . balance out the staff’s use of subpoenas and
depositions during the investigation stage,” CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 22, at 18, because although the SEC is limited to three notices in a proceeding,
they are not limited in the number of subpoenas “to provide documents and testimony
under oath,” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 17
(2015).
110 Compare SEC, AMENDMENTS, supra note 23, at 5 (“The amended rule would provide
that the hearing must be scheduled to begin approximately four months after service of
the order instituting proceedings, but not later than eight months after service of the
order.”), with Henning, supra note 23 (“Even with these amendments, the time in which an
administrative case would be completed is still fairly short, about one year.  Federal court
actions usually take two to three times as long because of the broader discovery
rights . . . .”).
111 Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
112 Id. at 506.
113 Id.; see also CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 13 (stating
that Gupta, who was not directly regulated by the SEC, was the only Galleon-related defen-
dant whose case was brought as an administrative proceeding).
114 Gupta, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 506.
115 Id. at 507.
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the grounds that a federal district court did not have jurisdiction over this
case and that Gupta “must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking
redress in federal court.”116  The U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York dismissed this motion.117  The court cited Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board and Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC,118 along
with other cases and statutes to determine that it does in fact have jurisdic-
tion, when it appears that a defendant was denied his or her equal protection
of the law.119  Before the case was decided on its merits, however, the SEC
agreed with Gupta to bring the claim in district court, leaving the issues of
standing and the other constitutional due process concerns brought by
Gupta unheard by the federal courts.120
Therefore, when the SEC began bringing more complicated insider-
trading cases through administrative proceedings towards the end of 2013,
many of the defendants decided to challenge the SEC’s forum selection in
federal district court.121  The following subparts will analyze the arguments
made by defendants, including: that ALJs are in fact inferior officers and
subject to the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution, and
that defendants in administrative proceedings are denied their constitutional
right to procedural due process, including right to a jury trial and equal pro-
tection of the law.  But first, the following subpart will discuss whether a
defendant in an administrative proceeding has standing in federal district
court before his or her case can be heard before an ALJ.
A. Jurisdiction: Three-Factor Test Presented in Free Enterprise Fund
The United States federal district courts “have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.”122  When challenging the constitutionality of administrative proceed-
ings, “it is established practice . . . to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts
to issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution.”123  In
order to obtain a preliminary injunction, which is what the defendants have
sought in federal district courts against the SEC, the defendant must prove
three elements: “(1) [H]e is likely to succeed on the merits of the underlying
116 Id. at 508–10.
117 Id. at 514.
118 See id. at 512–13 (citing Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (2010);
Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979)).
119 Id. at 513–14.
120 See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 13.
121 See generally Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-CV-2472, 2015 WL 4006165 (S.D.N.Y. June 30,
2015); Hill v. SEC, No. 1:150CV-01801, 2015 WL 4307088 (N.D. Ga. June 8, 2015); Duka v.
SEC (Duka I), No. 15 Civ. 357, 2015 WL 1943245 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015); Bebo v. SEC,
No. 15-C-3, 2015 WL 905349 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 3, 2015); Chau v. SEC, 72 F.Supp.3d 417
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).
122 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
123 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151 n.2 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
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claim, (2) he will suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief, and (3) the
public interest weighs in favor of granting the injunction.”124  The SEC
argues that even if the elements of a temporary injunction are present, the
federal district courts do not have jurisdiction because Congress intended to
restrict jurisdiction in these instances through the Dodd-Frank Act.125  In Free
Enterprise Fund, however, the Supreme Court outlined three factors that it
considers when deciding if Congress “intend[ed] to limit jurisdiction.”126
The first factor considered is whether “a finding of preclusion could fore-
close all meaningful judicial review.”127  The second factor is whether “the
suit is ‘wholly collateral to a statute’s review provisions.’”128  And the third
factor is whether “the claims are ‘outside the agency’s expertise.’”129
In cases such as Bebo—brought in the Eastern District of Wisconsin and
appealed to the Seventh Circuit—the court held that it did not have subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the case, which means that the court never
decided the case on the merits.130  The reasoning for this holding is that,
“meaningful judicial review is available to Bebo . . . because she does not have
to assume the risk of a sanction before testing the validity of the law.  If the
SEC renders an adverse final decision, judicial review awaits in the court of
appeals.”131  In Duka, however, the Southern District of New York disagreed
because “[t]he Court of Appeals obviously would not be able . . . to enjoin
the SEC from conducting the Administrative Proceeding, as Duka asks this
court to do.”132  Currently, Bebo seems to be the exception, and more courts
are deciding that defendants have subject matter jurisdiction.133
If courts find that the defendant in an SEC administrative proceeding
lacks “meaningful judicial review,” it is generally agreed upon that the argu-
ments made by defendants are “wholly collateral” because the defendants are
not attacking an order resulting from the administrative proceedings.
124 Pope v. Cty. of Albany, 687 F.3d 565, 570 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Oneida Nation of
N.Y. v. Cuomo, 645 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 2011)).
125 See Hill, 2015 WL 4307088, at *5.
126 See id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3150).
127 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3150 (quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510
U.S. 200, 212–13 (1994)).
128 Id. (quoting Thunder Basin Coal, 510 U.S. at 212).
129 Id. (quoting Thunder Basin Coal, 510 U.S. at 212).
130 See Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. Aug. 24, 2015); see also Bebo v. SEC, No.
15-C-3, 2015 WL 905349, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 3, 2015).
131 Bebo, 799 F.3d at 775.
132 Duka I, No. 15 Civ. 357, 2015 WL 1943245, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015).
133 Compare Bebo, 799 F.3d at 775 (holding that the court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction), with Duka v. SEC (Duka III), No. 15 Civ. 357, SEC 2015 WL 1943245, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015) (denying the SEC’s “motion to stay the . . . preliminary injunction
pending appeal”); Hill v. SEC, No 1:15-CV-01801-LLM, 2015 WL 4307088, at *20 (N.D. Ga.
June 8, 2015) (finding “a preliminary injunction is appropriate to enjoin the SEC adminis-
trative proceeding and to allow the Court sufficient time to consider this matter on the
merits”).
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Rather, they are challenging the constitutionality of that proceeding.134
Additionally, there is little to no dispute between district courts that ALJs lack
the expertise and ability to hear constitutional challenges,135 which is nota-
ble considering the SEC took it upon itself to find that the appointment of
ALJs is in fact constitutional because they are “mere employees” rather than
“inferior officers.”136
When determining whether a defendant’s claim passes the test for a pre-
liminary injunction, it is relatively easy to see how “irreparable harm” would
occur to the defendant if the case went through an administrative proceed-
ing and an ALJ ruled adversely on the defendant’s case.137  Additionally,
although the SEC claims that the efficiency and effectiveness of its adminis-
trative proceedings outweigh the defendant’s desire to have their case tried
in a federal district court, the court in Hill held that “[t]he public has an
interest in assuring that citizens are not subject to unconstitutional treatment
by the Government, and there is no evidence the SEC would be prejudiced
by a brief delay.”138  Therefore, the next subpart will discuss whether the
defendants’ arguments have merit to justify a preliminary injunction.
B. Appointment Clause Issues
Although defendants have challenged the SEC’s use of ALJs for many
different reasons, the issue that has received the most attention by federal
judges is the Appointments Clause issue.139  According to Article II of the
United States Constitution, “Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”140  The defendants’ argu-
ment has two parts.  First, and most debated, is that ALJs are inferior officers
of the United States and not employees as the SEC proposes.141  If the SEC is
correct and ALJs are only employees, then they do not need to be appointed
134 Duka III, 2015 WL 1943245, at *12 (“The Court notes . . . that the issue being
reviewed here is whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s constitu-
tional claim for injunctive and declaratory relief.  That is separate and apart from a federal
court’s jurisdiction to review any orders which may be issued by the SEC in the Administra-
tive Proceeding.”).
135 Id. at *14 (citing Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 212–13 (1994)); see
also Hill, 2015 WL 4307088, at *9 (N.D. Ga. June 8, 2015).
136 In re Lucia Cos., Inc., No. 3-15006, at 28–29 (U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Sept. 3,
2015).
137 Hill, 2015 WL 4307088, at *19 (“Plaintiff will be irreparably harmed if this injunc-
tion does not issue because . . . Plaintiff will be subject to an unconstitutional administra-
tive proceeding, and he would not be able to recover monetary damages for this harm
because the SEC has sovereign immunity.” (citing Odebrecht Const., Inc. v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268, 1289 (11th Cir. 2013))).
138 Id. (emphasis added).
139 See generally Hill, 2015 WL 4307088, at *9–19; Duka I, No. 15 Civ. 357, 2015 WL
1943245, at *7–10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015).
140 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
141 In re Lucia Cos., Inc., No. 3-15006, at 29.
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in accordance with the United States Constitution.142  Second, if ALJs are in
fact inferior officers, then they need to be “appointed by the President,
department heads, or courts of law.”143  The SEC concedes that ALJs were
not appointed by the President, a court of law, or a department head144—the
Supreme Court found in Free Enterprise Fund that the “SEC Commissioners
jointly constitute the ‘head’ of the SEC for appointment purposes.”145
Therefore, the main issue is whether SEC ALJs are inferior officers of the
United States or employees of the SEC.
When the Commissioners heard an appeal from an administrative pro-
ceeding regarding Raymond J. Lucia, Sr., the Commission held that its ALJs
were employees and not inferior officers;146 therefore, although ALJ Elliot
“was not appointed in a manner consistent with the Appointments Clause of
the Constitution,” the proceedings were valid and the Commission could
uphold the resulting orders.147  In making this decision, the Commissioners
relied solely on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Landry v. FDIC.148  In Landry,
the D.C. Circuit held that ALJs at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) were not inferior officers of the United States because they did not
have power to issue a final decision.149  In making this decision, the D.C.
Circuit had to distinguish the Supreme Court’s decision in Freytag v. Commis-
sioner.150 Freytag held that special trial judges (STJs) in Tax Court are infer-
ior officers, noting that “[t]he fact that an inferior officer on occasion
performs duties that may be performed by an employee not subject to the
Appointments Clause does not transform his status under the Constitu-
tion.”151 Landry highlights this last part, noting that the difference between
an STJ and an ALJ is “that STJs have the authority to render a final decision
of the tax court in declaratory judgment proceedings and in certain small-
amount tax cases. . . . But the ALJs here can never render the decision of the
142 Id.
143 Hill, 2015 WL 4307088, at *19 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 2).
144 Duka v. SEC (Duka II), No. 15 Civ. 357, 2015 WL 4940057, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3,
2015).
145 Hill, 2015 WL 4307088, at *19 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477,
511–12 (2010)).
146 In re Lucia Cos., Inc., No. 3-15006, at 28–33.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  Interestingly enough,
Landry still held that the D.C. Circuit had jurisdiction to hear the case—which is contrary
to the SEC’s argument in federal district court. Id. at 1131 (“Freytag itself indicates that
judicial review of an Appointments Clause claim will proceed even where any possible
injury is radically attenuated.”).
150 Id. at 1134 (distinguishing Landry from Freytag because it believed “the STJs’ power
of final decision in certain classes of cases was critical to the Court’s decision”).
151 Freytag v. CIR, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991).
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FDIC.”152  Not surprisingly, the SEC bases its argument on Landry,153 while
the defendants rely on Freytag.154
In Freytag, the Commissioner argued that the STJs were employees
because “they lack authority to enter a final decision.”155  The Supreme
Court, however, rejected this argument, saying that it “ignores the signifi-
cance of the duties and discretion that special trial judges possess.”156
Instead, the court focused on the fact that STJs were “‘established by
[l]aw,’ . . . and the duties, salary, and means of appointment for that office
are specified by statute.”157  Additionally, the Court focused on the fact that
STJs “perform more than ministerial tasks.”158  In Charles Hill’s supplemen-
tal brief, he argued that SEC ALJs perform similar if not the same tasks as the
STJs in Freytag.159  Additionally, he challenged the SEC’s argument that the
SEC ALJs do not render a final decision, because if the Commission does not
review a decision of the ALJ, then the ALJ’s decision is “deemed the action of
the Commission.”160
Following these comparisons to STJs, the defendants in SEC proceed-
ings have a compelling argument that ALJs are in fact inferior officers based
on the reasoning in Freytag—a Supreme Court decision—instead of the rea-
soning in Landry—a D.C. Circuit decision.  To make their argument even
more compelling, the defendants cite Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion—
which was joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter—in Freytag,
where he explicitly stated ALJs “are all executive officers.”161  Therefore, it is
not surprising that two different district courts halted four administrative
proceedings because the federal district court judges believed the Appoint-
ments Clause challenge may have merit.162
152 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133 (citation omitted).
153 In re Lucia Cos., Inc., No. 3-15006, at 28–33.
154 See Bebo Memorandum, supra note 13, at 37–38.
155 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
156 Id.
157 Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
158 Id. at 881–82 (stating further that STJs “take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the
admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery
orders. . . . [T]he special trial judges exercise significant discretion.”).
159 Hill Supplemental Brief, supra note 14, at 7 (“[T]hat SEC ALJs are conferred with
the authority to ‘[r]egulate the course of a hearing,’ 17 C.F.R. § 200.14, shows that, similar
to their STJ counterparts, SEC ALJs exercise ‘significant discretion’ in ‘carrying out the[ir]
important functions.” (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882) (alterations in original)).
160 Id. at 7–8 n.6 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c) (2012)).
161 Id. at 8 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 910 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) (emphasis added)).
162 See generally Gray Fin. Group, Inc. v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-0492 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015);
Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-CV-2472, 2015 WL 4006165 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015); Hill v. SEC, No.
1:15-CV-01801, 2015 WL 4307088 (N.D. Ga. June 8, 2015); Duka I, No. 15 Civ. 357, 2015
WL 1943245 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015).
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C. Due Process, Equal Protection, and Right to a Jury Trial
In Gupta, the Southern District of New York held that Gupta’s claim that
his equal protection rights were violated might have merit.163  As previously
mentioned, before the court was able to decide the matter, the SEC agreed
to move his case to federal district court—as opposed to an administrative
proceeding—if he agreed to drop his claim that his equal protection rights
were violated.164  More recently, defendants challenging the constitutionality
of the SEC’s use of administrative proceedings have continued to make simi-
lar procedural arguments that Gupta made in 2011.165  The defendants
asserted that the SEC’s use of administrative proceedings violates their right
to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.166  The second argument the
defendants asserted is that the Dodd-Frank Act deprives them of their Fifth
Amendment right to equal protection of the laws by “grant[ing] the SEC
unbridled authority to arbitrarily determine whether a citizen receives her
jury trial right.”167  The third and final procedural argument made by
defendants is that the SEC’s Rules of Practice deprive defendants of “prop-
erty” without providing them with “procedural due process” of law in viola-
tion of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.168
The first argument stems from the Seventh Amendment of the United
States Constitution, which states, “[i]n Suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved.”169  According to the Northern District of Georgia, the Seventh
Amendment applies to “an enforcement action for civil penalties,” which “is
‘clearly analogous to the 18th-century action in debt.’”170  The SEC agrees
with this argument.171  Instead, the SEC argues—and the Northern District
of Georgia agrees172—that due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Atlas Roof-
ing, Congress has the ability to assign the adjudication in cases that involve
“public rights”173 where the case arose “between the Government and per-
sons subject to its authority ‘in connection with the performance of the con-
stitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments.’”174
163 Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
164 See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 13.
165 Bebo Memorandum, supra note 13, at 12–33.
166 Hill, 2015 WL 4307088, at *13.
167 See Bebo Memorandum, supra note 13, at 22 (emphasis added).
168 Id. at 25 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976)).
169 Hill, 2015 WL 4307088, at *13 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VII) (alteration in
original).
170 Id. at *14 (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 420 (1987)).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. (quoting Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order or, in the Alternative, a Preliminary Injunction at 17, Hill v. SEC, No.
1:15-CV-01801-LLM, 2015 WL 4307088 (N.D. Ga. June 8, 2015) (alteration in original)).
174 Id. (quoting Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n,
430 U.S. 442, 457 (1977)).
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Defendants agree that the current issue involves a “public right;”175 instead,
they argue their right to a jury trial can only be taken away if “Congress is
creating [a] ‘new public right.’”176  The Northern District of Georgia reads
Atlas Roofing in a different manner.  The Court interprets Atlas to mean that
“[f]or cases involving public rights, Congress has the choice as to whether or
not a jury trial will be required.”177  Therefore, the court held that Hill did
not have a high likelihood of success on the merits.178  There may be more to
this argument, however.
First, as Justice Rehnquist wrote in his dissenting opinion in Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, “[t]he founders of our Nation considered the right of trial
by jury in civil cases an important bulwark against tyranny and corruption, a
safeguard too precious to be left to the whim of the sovereign, or, it might be
added to that of the judiciary.”179  The right to a jury trial has historically
been extremely important in the history of the United States.180  Addition-
ally, Atlas Roofing noted that the Court granted certiorari “under these cir-
cumstances,”181 referring to the circumstances “[w]here adjudicative
responsibility rests only in the administering agency.”182  In the case of the
SEC’s administrative proceedings, the adjudicative responsibility does not
only rest in the administrative proceeding, because “the SEC’s authority in
administrative penalty proceedings [is] coextensive with its authority to seek
penalties in Federal court.”183  Therefore, even if the Northern District of
Georgia ruled that defendants in SEC administrative proceedings do not
have the right to a jury trial, that does not mean that another district court
could disagree in the future, or that a federal court of appeals would not find
in favor of the defendant.
The second argument stems from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, which guarantee defendants equal protection of the law.184  In Gupta,
the Southern District of New York, held that Gupta may have merit on his
175 Id.
176 Id. (quoting Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Plaintiff’s Motion
for a Temporary Restraining Order or, in the Alternative, a Preliminary Injunction at 17,
Hill v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-01801-LLM, 2015 WL 4307088 (N.D. Ga. June 8, 2015)).
177 Id.
178 Id. (“The Court does not find Plaintiff’s argument persuasive.”).
179 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
180 Id. at 343 n.10 (“Thomas Jefferson stated: ‘I consider [trial by jury] as the only
anchor yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its
constitution.’” (quoting 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (H.A. Washington ed.
1861) (alteration in original))).
181 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442,
449 (1977).
182 Id. at 448 (quoting Atlas Roofing Co., 518 F.2d at 990, 1011 (1975)).
183 H.R. 111-687, at 78 (2010) (Investor Protection Act of 2009).
184 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Bebo Memorandum, supra note 13, at 22; see also Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (stating that “[t]his Court’s approach to
Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment” (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975))).
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claim, when he was one of twenty-nine Galleon-related defendants, and the
only one whose case was brought in an administrative proceeding.185
Clearly, he did not have the same protections under the law as the twenty-
eight other Galleon-related defendants.  The argument for current defend-
ants is slightly different though.186  In the cases of Bebo, Hill, and others
similarly situated, there are not twenty-eight other defendants in the case
who received the protections provided by federal district courts.  But what
makes Bebo and Hill different from other defendants in insider-trading cases
brought by the SEC in federal district court?  According to the SEC’s released
data for the year 2014, the SEC brought a total of fifty-two actions against
individuals involved in insider-trading cases.187  Of these fifty-two, twelve
were brought as administrative proceedings, and the remaining forty were
brought in federal district court.188  The defendants assert that they are simi-
larly situated to the forty defendants who had their cases heard in federal
court, and they should be afforded the same protections afforded to those
defendants.189
If, in fact, the defendants are similarly situated, then the SEC cannot
select a forum based on “an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification.”190  Currently, the SEC does not have a clear,
bright-line rule on forum selection.191  Instead, according to Andrew Cer-
esney, Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, the SEC makes its deci-
sion on “a case by case determination of which forum is appropriate based on
the particular facts of the case.”192  When the SEC can bring identical claims
and receive identical penalties in either federal district court or an adminis-
trative proceeding, it appears the SEC is trying to get a home-court advan-
tage, whenever it is beneficial to the SEC.193  In conclusion, it is possible that
a federal court of appeals or the Supreme Court could find that the defend-
ants had their equal protection rights violated, even if district courts have
recently held that the Appointments Clause issue is the only issue that may
have merit.
The third and final argument the defendants asserted challenging the
constitutionality of the SEC’s administrative proceedings stems from the Fifth
185 See Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
186 Id. at 513 (stating that “even if the SEC were acting within its discretion when it
imposed disparate treatment on Gupta that would not necessarily exculpate it from a claim
of unequal treatment if the unequal protection was still arbitrary and irrational”).
187 SEC, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2014 3, https://www.sec.gov/about/sec-
stats2014.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
188 Id.
189 Bebo Memorandum, supra note 13, at 22.
190 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (emphasis added).
191 See SEC, FORUM SELECTION, supra note 94, at 1 (“There is no rigid formula dictating
the choice of forum.”).
192 Andrew Ceresney, Director, SEC Division of Enforcement, Remarks to the Ameri-
can Bar Association’s Business Law Section Fall Meeting (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.sec
.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543515297.
193 See e.g., Bebo Memorandum, supra note 13, at 4.
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Amendment as well.194  The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion states that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.”195  Additionally, “[p]rocedural due process
imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of
‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”196  In the case of cease-and-desist
proceedings against defendants accused of insider trading, the penalties
include disgorgement and civil penalties.197  Therefore, “it is indisputable”
that the defendants have “a property interest at stake in the administrative
proceeding.”198  In these cases, Charles Hill, Barbara Duka, and Lynn Tilton
did not argue that their due process rights were violated in an administrative
proceeding.199  Laurie Bebo, however, did raise the issue, and the Eastern
District of Wisconsin—affirmed by the Seventh Circuit—did not address the
issue in its opinion because the court held that the federal district court did
not have jurisdiction for the reasons stated above.200
Therefore, this is an issue that is still mainly unaddressed by the courts.
When the SEC released its new proposed amendments, the only issues
addressed were the due process issues, and even these did not provide the
same level of procedural rights guaranteed in federal district courts.201
Therefore, the question is, “[W]hat procedural mechanisms are required in
order for the administrative proceeding to satisfy due process[?]”202  In
Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court held that
identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires con-
sideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Govern-
ment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.203
194 See id. at 25–27.
195 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
196 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
197 See Duka I, 2015 WL 1943245, No. 15-CV-357, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015).
198 Bebo Memorandum, supra note 13, at 26.
199 See generally Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order, or, in the Alternative, a Preliminary Injunction, Hill v. SEC,
No. 15-CV-01801 (N.D. Ga. June 2, 2015) (Doc. 21), 2015 WL 4185297; Reply Memoran-
dum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Barbara Duka’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order and a Preliminary Injunction, Duka v. SEC, No. 15-CV-357 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2015),
2015 WL 995695; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Demand for Jury
Trial, Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-CV-2472 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2015) (Doc. 1).
200 See generally Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 775 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 24, 2015).
201 See supra text accompanying notes 108–10.
202 See Bebo Memorandum, supra note 13, at 26.
203 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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First, defendants being charged by the SEC for insider-trading cases have
a strong private interest, as Justice Powell mentioned in his dissent in
Steadman v. SEC.204  Second, the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest”205 is extremely high.  As previously mentioned, in the year 2014, the
SEC won all of its cases brought in administrative proceedings compared to
only sixty-one percent of the cases brought in federal district court.206  Third,
the government continues to claim efficiency and effectiveness for the rea-
sons as to why it deprives defendants of procedural rights guaranteed in fed-
eral district court.207  Still, as mentioned in Hill, “there is no evidence the
SEC would be prejudiced by a brief delay to allow this Court to fully address
[the] claims.”208
IV. WHY THE SEC SHOULD FIX ITS APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE ISSUES AND
CONTINUE TO MODERNIZE ITS RULES OF PRACTICE TO ENSURE
A FAIR AND EFFICIENT FORUM
In recent months, the SEC has received plenty of criticism concerning its
increased use of administrative proceedings for cases involving non-regulated
entities or persons.209  Whether due to this criticism or a different reason,
the SEC’s enforcement division has released a guideline on forum selection,
and the SEC Commissioners proposed amendments to its Rules of Prac-
tice.210  As mentioned in the previous Part, however, there are still many
issues that the SEC has either refused to address or has attempted to address
and fallen short of procedural processes that are guaranteed to defendants in
federal district court.211  This Part discusses a few recommendations on how
the SEC can avoid future constitutional challenges and also recommenda-
tions that will ensure a fair and orderly process for all defendants.  Similar to
the United States Chamber of Commerce’s recommendations, the purpose
of this Note is not to hinder the SEC’s enforcement division.  However, in an
effort “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States,”212 defend-
ants should not be deprived of their constitutional rights, especially when
similarly situated cases are brought in federal district court when “it [is]
advantageous as a litigation tactic to file there.”213
204 Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 106 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that when
a defendant is being charged with violating securities laws, in many respects it is similar to
fraud, and “[i]t is clear . . . that the SEC’s finding of fraud and its imposition of harsh
penalties have resulted in serious stigma and deprivation”).
205 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
206 See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 7.
207 Id. at 6.
208 Hill v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-01801, 2015 WL 4307088, at *19 (N.D. Ga. June 8, 2015).
209 See supra notes 9–19 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 94–110 and accompanying text.
211 See supra Section III.C.
212 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).
213 See Bebo Memorandum, supra note 13, at 16.
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A. The SEC Should Follow the FTC and Fix Its Appointments Clause Issues
Ultimately, a federal court of appeals and/or possibly the United States
Supreme Court will decide whether SEC ALJs are inferior officers or employ-
ees.  That does not mean, however, that the SEC should not go ahead and
make changes to the appointments of its ALJs.  Similar to the SEC, the FTC
held that its ALJs are in fact employees and not inferior officers in a recent
decision.214  Additionally, the FTC ratified the appointment of its ALJs in
order to avoid the issue in the future.215  The SEC should follow the FTC and
have the Commissioners appoint the ALJs to their position.
In the Hill decision, Judge May stated that the Appointments Clause
issue would be an easy fix.216  Additionally, in the Duka decision, Judge
Berman originally only issued a seven-day injunction, while he waited to see if
the SEC Commissioners would appoint its ALJs and avoid the entire issue.217
The SEC, however, has stubbornly refused to have the Commissioners
appoint the ALJs to avoid this entire issue.218  Some people think that the
SEC is concerned that if it gives in and corrects the issue, then it will reopen
past administrative decisions.219  Others don’t see an issue with retroactivity,
214 See In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, at *2 (FTC Sept. 14, 2015) (“Commission adminis-
trative law judges are . . . employees with limited authority; they are not ‘inferior officers’
subject to the Appointments Clause.” (quoting Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133–34
(D.C. Cir. 2000))).
215 Id. (“Nonetheless, although we conclude that the Appointments Clause does not
apply to the hiring of Commission administrative law judges, the Commission, purely as a
matter of discretion, has ratified Judge Chappell’s appointment . . . as the Commission’s
Chief Administrative Law Judge.  This action by the Commission puts to rest any possible
claim that this administrative proceeding violates the Appointments Clause.”).
216 See Hill v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-01801-LLM, 2015 WL 4307088, at *20 (N.D. Ga. June 8,
2015) (“[T]his conclusion may seem unduly technical, as the ALJ’s appointment could
easily be cured by having the SEC Commissioners issue an appointment or preside over the
matter themselves.”).
217 Duka II, No. 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 WL 4940083, at *3 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 12,
2015).
218 Letter from Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney, et al., to the Honorable Richard M.
Berman, U.S. Dist. Judge 1 (Aug. 10, 2015), https://securitiesdiary.files.wordpress.com/
2014/11/sec-response-to-judge-richard-berman-re-appointment-of-aljs.pdf (“Although the
Commission in its adjudicatory capacity may decide in due course whether SEC ALJs’
appointments violate the Constitution and, if so, the appropriate remedy for such a viola-
tion, as of the filing of this letter, the Commission has not issued a decision or otherwise
taken any public action on these questions.”).  Note that since this letter, the Commission
did decide the question in In re Lucia, and the Commission held that the ALJs were
employees and not inferior officers.  Therefore, they were not in violation of the Appoint-
ments Clause. In re Lucia Cos., Inc., No. 3-15006, at *28 (U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Sept.
3, 2015).
219 Eaglesham, SEC Fights, supra note 16 (“Thomas McCarthy, a past president of the
Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference, an association of in-house judges for the
SEC and other government agencies, said in an interview the wrangles could ‘open a can
of worms’ by calling into question hundreds of administrative law judges’ decisions across
government.”). Contra Jean Eaglesham, Federal Judge Rules SEC In-House Judge’s Appointment
“Likely Unconstitutional”, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-
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stating, “When it’s done, it’s done,” and presenting the question why is the
SEC “doing all of this?”220  The SEC should fix this problem, and there is a
straightforward solution.  The Commissioners were deemed the head of the
department in Free Enterprise Fund;221 therefore, the Commissioners have to
appoint the ALJs, and then the SEC can continue with its administrative pro-
ceedings in Duka and Hill—instead of going through the federal appeals pro-
cess.  Additionally, because a federal court of appeals would not hear the
case, past defendants will not be able to point to a federal court of appeals
decision that holds that the past appointments procedures were unconstitu-
tional.  This should benefit the SEC in cases appealing a prior, adverse deci-
sion.  Even if retroactivity becomes an issue in the future, it is still beneficial
for the SEC to ratify the appointments of its ALJs.  This will protect the cur-
rent decisions made by ALJs in an administrative proceeding, so that in the
future, the decisions will not be challenged.  Therefore, it will allow the SEC
to move past this recent criticism and return to its mission to “protect inves-
tors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation.”222
B. The SEC Needs to Follow a “Rigid Formula” When Selecting Its Forum to
Prevent Violation of the Equal Protection Clause—Especially in Regard
to Non-Regulated Entities or Persons
Historically, the SEC has had two options when deciding which forum to
bring an action in.  First, the SEC could bring its case in-house in an adminis-
trative proceeding before an ALJ.  Or second, the SEC could bring a civil
action in federal district court.223  Some of the civil penalties are only obtain-
able through an administrative proceeding, and it makes sense to bring those
cases in an administrative proceeding.224  However, now that the SEC can
bring similar cases against non-regulated individuals and/or entities in either
a federal district court or in an administrative proceeding, it has raised the
question how the SEC should select its forum.
Currently, the SEC has no formula on how to select its forum, and it
admits this much in its recently released Division of Enforcement Approach to
Forum Selection in Contested Actions.225 Unsurprisingly, this has led defendants
to claim that the SEC is simply shopping for whichever forum provides it with
the highest chance of winning—and if this is the goal, the SEC has accom-
judge-rules-sec-in-house-judges-appointment-likely-unconstitutional-1433796161 (“SEC
officials don’t think rulings by agency judges . . . would be open to challenges in this way,
in part because the agency’s commissioners sign off on the final decision . . . .”).
220 See Alison Frankel, Unlike SEC, FTC Makes Quick Fix to Ward Off ALJ Constitutional
Challenges, REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/09/
16/unlike-sec-ftc-makes-quick-fix-to-ward-off-alj-constitutional-challenges/.
221 See generally Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
222 What We Do, supra note 27.
223 See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 3.
224 Id.
225 See SEC, FORUM SELECTION, supra note 94, at 1.
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plished it, given its high success rate in administrative proceedings.226
Therefore, it is imperative that at a minimum, the SEC creates a rigid
formula on how it will select its forum.  Even better would be if the SEC
followed the recommendations proposed by the United States Chamber of
Commerce, which would allow any defendant in an administrative proceed-
ing to move the case to a federal district court in order to have a right to a
jury trial.227  Although, even if the more radical changes are not followed,
the SEC needs to be clear and explicit with how it selects its forum in order
to avoid equal protection claims and also to be fair to defendants.
When creating a rigid formula to follow, the SEC has already laid out the
framework in its Division of Enforcement Approach to Forum Selection in Contested
Actions.  For instance, under the category of “[f]air, consistent, and effective
resolution of securities law issues and matters,” the enforcement division says
that it will consider whether “a contested matter is likely to raise unsettled
and complex legal issues.”228  Therefore, the SEC is already considering this
factor; it also states, however, that “the Division may in its discretion” con-
sider whichever factors it would like to consider.229  This factor should be
dispositive, and if the case raises “unsettled and complex legal issues,”230
then the SEC should be required to bring the case in federal district court.
This would prevent the SEC from creating new laws that would need to be
followed by a court of appeals—similar to what happened in VanCook v. SEC,
where the Second Circuit upheld an ALJ’s interpretation of the law over a
federal court’s interpretation because of Chevron deference.231  I can hardly
imagine Congress intended for the SEC’s ALJs to have the ability to create
new laws,232 and this solution would also ease Judge Rakoff’s concerns
presented in his speech at the PLI Securities Regulation Institute in 2014.233
Other factors that the SEC needs to include in its “rigid formula” are
also included as current factors that may be considered under the SEC’s cur-
226 See supra notes 12–23 and accompanying text.
227 See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 4.
228 SEC, FORUM SELECTION, supra note 94, at 3.
229 Id. at 1.
230 Id. at 3; see also CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 3
(stating that the SEC should consider whether “[t]he proceeding is based upon well-estab-
lished legal principles that have been adopted by Article III courts”).
231 See VanCook v. SEC, 653 F.3d 130, 140 n.8 (2d Cir. 2011) (stating that the SEC’s
“interpretation of Rule 10b-5 ‘trumps’ our prior interpretation” (quoting Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005))); see also Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (“When a challenge to
an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the
wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap
left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.”).
232 See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 32, at 393 (“Congress took comfort in the fact that
federal judges would operate as an independent check to the Commission’s decision to
seek an issuer penalty and the amount sought to be recovered.”).
233 See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 12 (“I would urge the S.E.C. to consider that it is neither
in its own long-term interest, nor in the interest of the securities markets, nor in the inter-
est of the public as a whole, for the S.E.C. to become, in effect, a law onto [sic] itself.”).
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rent guidelines for forum selection.  For instance, one of the factors listed is
“[t]he availability of the desired claims, legal theories, and forms of relief in
each forum.”234  This factor refers to the SEC’s ability to bring “charges of
failure to supervise or causing another person’s violation [that] can only be
pursued in the administrative forum.”235  We can compare this with request-
ing an injunction to immediately stop a person’s actions, which the SEC can
only bring in federal district court.236  Again, this factor should be disposi-
tive, and it fits in perfectly with a rigid formula.  Another factor that should
be dispositive—rather than just a consideration—is whether the defendant is
a regulated person or entity.  Historically, the SEC could only charge non-
regulated persons or entities in federal district court—and the ability to
impose civil monetary penalties against non-regulated persons or entities is a
relatively modern expansion of power.237  The Dodd-Frank Act, however,
allowed the SEC to impose civil monetary penalties against non-regulated
persons or entities through an administrative proceeding.238  Ideally, the
SEC would implement a rigid formula that says it will bring all cases against
non-regulated persons or entities in federal district court.  Considering that
the SEC is unlikely to give up this increased power willingly,239 Congress may
need to address this factor.  Congress should consider revising and amending
the portion of the Dodd-Frank Act that allows the SEC “to bring almost all
enforcement actions as either an administrative proceeding or as a civil
action.”240  The problem with giving the SEC this discretion is that it allows
the SEC to abuse this authority and allows it to forum shop based on which-
ever forum is more beneficial, as compared to whichever is more fair.
The other factor the SEC mentions in its Division of Enforcement Approach
to Forum Selection in Contested Actions, states that the enforcement division con-
siders “[t]he cost-, resource-, and time-effectiveness of litigation in each
forum.”241  Although having a fast, efficient forum is important, this factor
should not be dispositive, because the elements of fairness should outweigh
this factor.  When a defendant has the possibility of losing “property,” they
234 See SEC, FORUM SELECTION, supra note 94, at 1; see also CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 3 (stating that the SEC should consider whether
“[t]he staff is alleging a cause of action that may be brought only in an administrative
proceeding”).
235 SEC, FORUM SELECTION, supra note 94, at 1 (emphasis added).
236 Id.
237 See supra Part I.
238 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 12.
239 Rakoff, supra note 2, at 5–6 (“This sea-change has come about almost entirely at the
request of the S.E.C., usually by tacking the provisions authorizing such expansion onto
one or another statute enacted in the wake of a financial scandal.”).
240 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 3.
241 SEC, FORUM SELECTION, supra note 96, at 2–3. Contra CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REC-
OMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 18 (“It should also adopt a procedural mechanism to
enable a possible respondent to challenge the application of these principles to a specific
matter, in a way that is fair and that does not unduly delay the proceeding or impose
awkward adjudicative duties on an ALJ.”).
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are guaranteed the right to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution.242  Therefore, with the current differences between the choice
of forums, the fairness factors should play a larger role in the SEC’s decision
rather than the cost and the time the trial will take in comparison to the
administrative proceeding.  Overall, the goal of a rigid formula should be to
prevent the SEC from arbitrarily selecting its forum based on where it thinks
it has the best chance of winning and to ensure a fair process for all parties
involved.
C. The SEC Needs to Amend Its Rules of Practice to Conform More with Federal
Rules in District Courts
This last recommendation is directly analogous to the fourth recommen-
dation proposed by the United States Chamber of Commerce.243  It is impor-
tant to note that since the United States Chamber of Commerce published its
recommendations, the SEC has proposed amendments to its Rules of Prac-
tice.244  These proposed amendments, however, do not do enough to ensure
defendants have a fair trial and receive all of their protections under proce-
dural due process.  According to Robert Khuzami, former Director of
Enforcement at the SEC, the only reason the SEC gave for an expansion of
enforcement policies against non-regulated persons or entities in the Dodd-
Frank Act was for “effectiveness and efficiency.”245  Therefore, when applying
the three factors from Mathews—mentioned earlier—the only “governmental
interest[ ]”246 is “effectiveness and efficiency.”247  This poses the question:
Are federal courts willing to forfeit fairness for efficiency?
The SEC’s proposed amendments to its Rules of Practice provide signifi-
cantly more procedural rights for defendants than they were provided
before.  There are a few issues, however, that should still be addressed.  For
instance, the proposed amendment explicitly states that the Commission is
seeking to clarify rules concerning the admittance of hearsay.  By clarifying,
the Commission “propose[s] to add Rule320(b) to clarify that hearsay may be
admitted if it is relevant, material, and bears satisfactory indicia of reliability so
that its use is fair.”248  Therefore, by “clarifying,” the SEC is directly stating
that hearsay—which is banned in federal courts through the Federal Rules of
Evidence249—can be admitted in an administrative proceeding.
This proposed rule is still unsatisfactory, especially when put in context
of the other rules.  For instance, the proposed amendments allow defendants
242 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
243 See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 4.
244 See generally SEC, AMENDMENTS, supra note 23, at 3 (proposing adjustments to
administrative proceedings to allow for discovery devices to “introduce additional flexibil-
ity . . . while still providing for the timely and efficient disposition of proceedings”).
245 See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 6.
246 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340 (1976).
247 See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 6.
248 See SEC, AMENDMENTS, supra note 23, at 16–18 (emphasis added).
249 See FED. R. EVID. 802.
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to “file notices to depose three persons.”250  This is a major improvement
over the previous rule, where defendants could only take an oral deposition
if the person could not attend the hearing.251  In contrast, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure allow for up to ten depositions without leave, and even
more with leave.252  The main problem is that the SEC can spend years inves-
tigating the defendants, during which the SEC has the ability to issue subpoe-
nas for documents and testimony.253  Without providing defendants a
chance to depose more individuals, however, the only information they can
use in court is the information provided by the SEC and the three individuals
they can depose.254  This provides issues with whom to depose out of all of
the possible witnesses, and may not lead to the results needed to show inno-
cence on the part of the defendant.  Additionally, if the SEC is permitting
hearsay, the defendants may not be able to properly depose and contradict
witnesses who are citing potentially unreliable sources.255  Additionally, the
SEC amendments could follow many of the rules already published in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence, which are
already being used in federal courts.  Therefore, in order to promote fairness
and prevent constitutional due process concerns, the SEC should propose
additional amendments to align more closely with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
CONCLUSION
The SEC should fix its Appointments Clause issue, create a rigid formula
for its forum selection, and add additional amendments to its Rules of Prac-
tice to conform more to the procedural rights in federal district courts.
Although the SEC was granted the right to bring complex insider-trading
cases in administrative proceedings rather than federal district courts
through the Dodd-Frank Act, the increased use of administrative proceedings
and timing of its decision to bring more cases internally led to much criti-
cism.256  The SEC is an organization tasked with protecting markets and
investors.  If the procedures used by the SEC are called into question, how-
ever, the effectiveness of its practice may also be called into question,257
which would cause more harm than good.  Therefore, it is important that the
SEC take the recent criticism seriously.
250 SEC, AMENDMENTS, supra note 23, at 7.
251 Id.
252 FED. R. CIV. P. 31(a)(1)–(2).
253 See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 53 (finding that
only sixteen percent of “[f]ormal” investigations were resolved in a year or less, while fifty-
nine percent of “formal” investigations took three to five years or longer).
254 See Henning, supra note 17.
255 Id.
256 See supra notes 9–19 and accompanying text.
257 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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In order to fix the Appointments Clause issue, the Commissioners of the
SEC need to appoint—or, as the FTC did, ratify the appointment of258—the
current SEC ALJs who were not appointed by the SEC Commissioners.  This
should be a relatively simple adjustment to implement, and as with many of
the defendants who agree to settlements with the SEC, they do not even have
to admit wrongdoing.  Ideally, this would not affect past decisions, but even if
it does, it will protect future decisions made by ALJs from being challenged
by what Judge May calls an “unduly technical” decision.259  Additionally, by
providing clear guidelines for which cases are brought in federal district
court as compared to internally within the SEC, the SEC will show investors
and companies that the processes used by the SEC are in fact fair and provide
defendants with a clear, unambiguous notice of which forum will hear their
charges.  The final recommendation seeks to improve on the recent amend-
ments made by the SEC.  Similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay
should not be included in administrative proceedings, because hearsay will
not make a proceeding more efficient, and it will unduly prejudice the defen-
dant.  Further, defendants deserve more comprehensive pre-discovery rights,
which could easily be accomplished by listing factors in which defendants can
request additional depositions, similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.  With these changes, the SEC can return to its overall mission to “pro-
tect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and to facilitate
capital formation,”260 without being criticized in the Wall Street Journal on a
regular basis.
258 See In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, at 2 (FTC Sept. 14, 2015).
259 See Hill v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-01801, 2015 WL 4307088, at *20 (N.D. Ga. June 8,
2015).
260 What We Do, supra note 27.
